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Toward a Comprehensive Fair Information
Standards Law: A Commentary on the
Data Privacy Issue in Minnesota
G. Theodore Mitau*
The relationship between the collection and use of information
by the government and a possible zone of personal privacy has be-
come. a pressing political and legal issue in this country. The real and
potential danger inherent in widespread governmental use of com-
puter technology demands a careful and continuing analysis of the
conflict between the perceived needs of administrators and the rea-
sonable expectations of personal privacy. In order to avoid unin-
tended consequences that significantly shift risks, rights, and duties
between government and individual citizens, strict constraints must
be imposed to limit the manner in which governmental agencies
gather, use, and disclose personal information.
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, the data collection and retention capabilities of
the government have rapidly expanded as a result of technological
improvements in data processing and an overall increase in the num-
ber of computers available.1 One indication of this expansion is the
federal government's inventory level of automatic data processing
equipment, which rose from a mere two computers in 1951 to a total
of nearly six thousand in 1971.2 By utilizing these enhanced data
processing capabilities, federal agencies can now have access to sig-
nificant amounts of personally intrusive information concerning vast
numbers of people. For example, the United States Civil Service
Commission has a security investigation index containing over ten
million index cards, 3 the Washington National Records Center main-
* Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, State University System of
Minnesota. The research assistance of Frederick D. Huebner and Robert W. Sargeant
is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMA-
TION Socir app. 5, at 10-15 (1977) (Technology and Privacy).
2. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN., AUToMATic DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT
INVENTORY 18, chart 1 (1977); Ervin, The First Amendment: A Living Thought in the
Computer Age, in SURVEILANCE, DATAVEILLANCE AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS 24 (1973)
(original version appeared in 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 1-235 (1972)) (citing
U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMIN., INVENTORY OF AuTOMTmic DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT
IN THE UNrrE STATES FISCAL YEAR 1971, at 15).
3. Ervin, supra note 2, at 31.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tains over two million investigative files,4 and the investigative re-
cords of the United States Army contain seven million files "relating
principally to security and criminal investigations of former and pres-
ent members of the Army, civilian employees, and employees of pri-
vate contractors doing business with the Army. '
State and local governments have also expanded their computer
and informational capabilities. A 1970 report by the National Asso-
ciation for State Information Systems indicated that 35 states em-
ployed over 24,500 people to maintain and develop automatic or elec-
tronic data processing systems. During the five-year period from
1966 to 1970, the computer capabilities of state governments in-
creased by fifty percent.7
As the need for more comprehensive governmental services and
regulatory activities increases, demand for information will undoubt-
edly escalate, perhaps exponentially. Public agencies facing legisla-
tive insistence on greater accountability, more effective management
practices, and more elaborate budget justifications will search for
broader informational resources with which to make decisions. In
such a context, computer-based information systems offer an enor-
mous potential for data storage and retrieval that will no doubt prove
useful. Policy questions concerning education, taxation, law enforce-
ment, welfare, health care, employment, energy, and the environ-
ment often require an immense data base for impact studies and
simulation models. Effective scientific analysis and evaluation of pol-
icy consequences in these areas demand extensive data files of group,
family, and individual characteristics.
Although the demand for information may be great, it is difficult
to overstate the threat these developments pose for individual pri-
vacy. For example, testimony received by the Senate Select Commit-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 33. Additional information about millions of citizens is stored in the files
of such diverse federal agencies and departments as the Veterans Administration, the
Census Bureau, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Election Commission, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, the Justice
Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department, and
the Small Business Administration.
6. Id. (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR STATE INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INFORMA-
TION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY IN STATE GOVERNMENT 18 (1970)).
Private business and commercial use of automatic data processing in credit infor-
mation service has reached an equally impressive volume. For example, Sears Roebuck
& Co. reportedly maintains 24 million active credit accounts; Equifax, Inc., an Atlanta
credit reporting company, prepares up to 35 million reports a year, including more than
sixty percent of all insurance investigations. Bus. WEEK, April 4, 1977, at 104.
7. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 64 (A. Westin
& M. Baker eds. 1972) (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR STATE INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY IN STATE GovERNmENT (1970)).
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tee to Study Governmental Operations led the Committee to con-
clude that "domestic intelligence activity has threatened and under-
mined the constitutional rights of Americans to free speech, associa-
tion and privacy."8 The Committee found that domestic intelligence
operations, conducted under claimed inherent executive powers,'
subjected a wide range of individuals, from political activists to gov-
ernmental employees and elected officials, to "[s]urreptitious en-
tries. . . in violation of law"'' 0 and to covert tactics aimed at discred-
iting their reputations, disrupting their careers, and destroying their
marriages." The Nixon impeachment hearings document the lengths
to which former President Nixon went in employing governmental
agencies and data processing capabilities for constitutionally ques-
tionable purposes.'
2
8. SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GovERNmENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE
Acrivmrs AND THE RIGHTS OF AMmuCANS, Book II, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
290 (1976). In addition to finding that "intelligence agencies ... regularly collected
information about personal and political activities irrelevant to any legitimate govern-
mental interest," id. at 165, the Committee concluded that
(a) Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic
groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and sur-
veillance.
(b) The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations
... contributed to overbreadth ....
(c) The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and over-
inclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations ...
extend[ing] beyond "subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and
individuals subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no
"potential" for violence.
(d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to in-
telligence collection-drawing in all available information about groups and
individuals, including their lawful political activity and details of their per-
sonal lives.
Id.
9. Id. at 134.
10. Id. at 204.
11. Id. at 211. Perhaps the most notorious example of such activities was the
campaign to "neutralize" Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Intelligence operations included
microphones planted in his bedroom, physical and photographic surveillances, and
anonymous mailings. One mailing included a tape with an unsigned letter, sent just
prior to Dr. King's departure for Europe where he was to receive the Nobel Peace Prize,
that warned him, "'your end is approaching . . .you are finished.'" Id. at 221.
Additional efforts to destroy Dr. King and his movement led the FBI to engage in
measures that would "prevent him from meeting with world leaders, receiving honors
or favorable publicity, and gaining financial support." Id. at 222.
In other intelligence operations, various governmental agencies opened and photo-
graphed nearly 250,000 pieces of first-class mail, intercepted millions of private tele-
grams, and established over 500,000 domestic intelligence files on various individuals
and groups. See id. at 6-7.
12. Article II of the Articles of Impeachment adopted by the House Judiciary
Committee illustrates how President Nixon allegedly misused government data banks:
1978]
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The familiar warning that "it will go on your records and follow
you the rest of your life" takes on new meaning as governmental
agencies adopt state-of-the-art computer technology. Cases docu-
menting actual agency abuse of sensitive data abound,'3 but even
(1) He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents,
endeavored to obtain from the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of the
constitutional rights of citizens, confidential information contained in in-
come tax returns for purposes not authorized by law, and to cause, in viola-
tion of the constitutional rights of citizens, income tax audits or other income
tax investigations to be initiated or conducted in a discriminatory manner.
(2) He misused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Serv-
ice, and other executive personnel in violation or disregard of the constitu-
tional rightsof citizens, by directing or authorizing such agenies or personnel
to conduct or continue electronic surveillance or other investigations for
purposes unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws, or any
other lawful function of his office; . . . and he did direct the concealment of
certain records made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of electronic
surveillance.
(3) He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and
agents, in violation or disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens,
authorized and permitted to be maintained a secret investigative unit within
the office of the President . . ..
Articles of Impeachment, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. Rc.
29219 (1974).
13. An alarming example of misuse of sensitive information occurred recently in
Minnesota. A child in a suburban elementary school was placed in a program for
retarded children. When her parents learned of this, they took the child to the Univer-
sity of Minnesota for evaluation. The University psychologist determined that the
child was not retarded but did have a learning disability related to a hearing problem.
When these results were transmitted to the school, the child was placed in the proper
program. The parents, concerned that the "retarded" label may become known and
cause the child problems in the future, requested that the inaccurate data be changed
to reflect the child's true mental condition. The school district, while admitting that
the "retarded" label was incorrect, refused to change the school records. See Memoran-
dum from Donald Gemberling, Minn. Dep't of Administration, Data Privacy Unit, to
Representative Shirley Hokanson (Apr. 20, 1977).
State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith, 78 Wash. 2d 152, 470 P.2d 172, cert. denied, 402
U.S. 1000 (1970), presents another startling illustration of what may happen to a data
subject in a welfare setting. Catherine Tarver, a welfare mother with three minor
children, became ill and was hospitalized. Local police placed her children in the
county youth center, under the care and protection of the juvenile court. After review-
ing an unsubstantiated report by her caseworker alleging child neglect, the court
removed the children from Ms. Tarver's custody. Although she was later exonerated
and the children returned to her custody, the caseworker's report remained in Cather-
ine Tarver's file at the Washington Department of Public Assistance. Ms. Tarver
wanted to have the report removed from her file on the grounds that it was false,
misleading, and prejudicial. When she requested that the Department hold a hearing
in which she might challenge the report, the Department refused, arguing that the
grievance was not directly related to eligiblity for public assistance. The state court
agreed with the welfare agency. Catherine Tarver's file remains intact.
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these do not accurately reflect the magnitude of the problem. As one
commentator noted, "[xv]e must recognize that we are dealing with
a new technology, whose applications are just beginning to be per-
ceived and whose capacity to deprive us of our privacy simply cannot
be measured in terms of existing systems or assumptions about the
immutability of the technology.' ' 4
This Article will examine several possible ways of dealing with
the data privacy issue. It will suggest that currently neither the
United States Constitution nor state constitutions are sufficient to
ensure an effective zone of personal privacy in informational con-
cerns. Following an examination of the Minnesota Data Privacy Act,
the Article will delineate several specific deficiencies of this statutory
approach and will suggest how these problems might best be solved.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that certain
individual privacy interests are constitutionally protected, guar-
anteeing to individuals the freedom to make decisions regarding the
intimate and fundamental areas of their lives." This aspect of per-
14. Miller, Symposium-Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy: On
Proposals and Requirements for Solutions, 53 MINN. L. RPv. 224, 227 (1968).
15. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, found a Connecticut statute outlawing birth control devices to be an
unwarranted intrusion into the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." Id. at 485. In
a remarkably creative piece of constitutional interpretation, the statute was held to
contravene a "zone of privacy"-a "penumbral" right created by, but not contained
in, the various textual guarantees of the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments. See id.
The constitutional basis for a right of personal privacy was developed further in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed
puzzlement over the source of a right of privacy, but determined that, wherever the
right came from, it was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. Apparently reluctant to rely too heavily
on the precarious penumbra doctrine of Griswold, Blackmun found traces of a right of
privacy in cases that had held constitutionally protected the private possession of
obscene material, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), a phone conversation in
a public phone booth, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), various aspects
of the marriage relationship, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the use of
contraceptives, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and the rearing and
education of one's children, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 519 (1925). The
contribution of the Roe Court is its suggestion that the constitutional guarantee of
personal privacy might protect other interests "that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connect-
icut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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sonal privacy, which might be termed "autonomy,"' 6 should be dis-
tinguished from "informational privacy,"' 7 which appears to be a
triangular configuration composed of the individual, the government,
and one or more third parties. An individual's interest in informa-
tional privacy encompasses not only the manner in which the state
gathers and uses personal information,"8 but also the impact that
disclosure of such information to third parties will have upon the data
subject.6
It is doubtful that the Federal Constitution will be fully able to
guarantee emerging expectations of informational privacy against an
increasingly inquisitive bureaucracy seeking data to fill its vast com-
puter memory banks. In Paul v. Davis,"0 for example, the Supreme
Court refused to extend to informational privacy the constitutional
protections that it had previously extended to personal autonomy.
The Court held that a person who had been arrested for, but not
convicted of, shoplifting could not assert a constitutional right of
privacy against police publication of his name and picture as a
"known" thief.2' Paul is particularly relevant to data privacy con-
cerns since the Court expressly stated that the publication of deroga-
16. See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
17. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 & n.24 (1977).
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), presents one example of how
the government has used developing technology for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion. Although the majority in Olmstead held that evidence procured by a warrantless
wiretap of a defendant's private phone conversation was admissible, the case is best
remembered for the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis, who argued for a broad
right of personal privacy. Brandeis characterized the right of privacy as "the right to
be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Id. at 478. The dissent, which suggested a fourth amendment foundation for the
right of privacy, was reminiscent of an earlier work in which Brandeis had expressed a
prophetic concern about the "numerous mechanical devices that threaten to make
good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
housetops.'" Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hav. L. REv. 193, 195
(1890).
Although Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), subsequently overruled
Olmstead, the Supreme Court was not willing to adopt fully the suggestion of Justice
Brandeis:
[Tihe Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitu-
tional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go fur-
ther, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of
the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental
invasion. But the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right
to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of
his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.
Id. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
19. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 158-68 (1967).
20. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
21. See id. at 713.
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tory information from an official record did not contravene the plain-
tiff's constitutional right of privacy:
Respondent's claim is far afield from [the personal autonomy] line
of decisions. He claims constitutional protection against the disclo-
sure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge. His claim is
based, not upon any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his
freedom of action in a sphere contended to be "private," but instead
on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official
act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions hold
anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner.2
Put simply, Paul determined that while the Constitution provides
some protection for personal autonomy, it does nothing to ensure
informational privacy.
In Whalen v. Roe,2n the Supreme Court had occasion to recon-
sider whether the Constitution limits how a state can gather and use
personal information. Responding to a concern that potentially harm-
ful drugs were being prescribed and dispensed illegally, the New York
Legislature enacted a statutory program requiring all prescriptions
for certain drugs to be recorded. 2' The name, address, and age of the
patient, along with the type and dosage of the drug, were filed in
computer data banks. A group of patients who had been regularly
receiving such drugs commenced an action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the patient identification requirement. The plaintiffs al-
leged that persons in need of the restricted drugs would decline treat-
ment because of their fear that governmental misuse of the sensitive
data would "cause them to be stigmatized as 'drug addicts.' ",25
The district court held that the doctor-patient relationship was
"one of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional protection" 26 and
enjoined enforcement of the statute. 2 The Supreme Court reversed
on the ground that the statute adequately protected the privacy con-
cerns raised by the plaintiffs.2 Notwithstanding clear language to the
contrary in Paul, the Court's discussion seemed to imply that some
aspects of informational privacy may be constitutionally protected:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumu-
lation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the
22. Id.
23. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
24. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3331(6), 3332(2)(a), 3334(4) (McKinney 1977).
25. 429 U.S. at 595.
26. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
27. See id. at 938.
28. 429 U.S. at 605.
1978]
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distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision
of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces and the enforce-
ment of the criminal laws, all require the orderly preservation of
great quantities of information, much of which is personal in charac-
ter and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right
to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accom-
panied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid un-
warranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances that
duty originally has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New
York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative pro-
cedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the indi-
vidual's interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not,
decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted
disclosure of accumulated private data-whether intentional or un-
intentional-or by a system that did not contain comparable secu-
rity provisions."
Although Whalen suggested that some informational privacy
concerns may be constitutionally protected, it did not attempt to
delineate the boundaries of that protection. Thus, especially when
considered in light of the Paul decision, Whalen does not go very far
toward vindicating reasonable expectations of informational privacy.
While the case leaves room for further development of the right of
privacy in the context of proliferating state use of computer techno-
logy, it simply cannot be relied on to prohibit all potential abuses of
personal data by governmental agencies.
It may also be unrealistic to expect a majority of the present
Supreme Court enthusiastically to endorse an expansive construction
of the elusive constitutional right of privacy. Indeed, disappointment
with the Burger Court's consistent refusal to take an active role in
protecting civil liberties generally led Justice Brennan recently to
invite state supreme courts to interpret their own constitutions
broadly in order to guarantee individual rights and liberties:
If the Supreme Court insists on limiting the content of due process
to the rights created by state law, state courts can breathe new life
into the federal due process clause by interpreting their common
law, statutes and constitutions to guarantee a "property" and
"liberty" that even the federal courts must protect.?
Justice Brennan praises various state court decisions imposing
higher standards of civil liberties than would have been required by
the present majority of the Supreme Court." The California Supreme
29. Id. at 605-06 (footnote omitted).
30. Brennan, State Constitutions and Protection of Individual Civil Rights, 90
HARv. L. Ray. 489, 503 (1977) (footnote omitted).
31. See id. at 498-502. Justice Brennan cites, for example, a New Jersey case that
went beyond Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), and imposed a higher
[Vol. 62:649
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Court, for example, in insisting on strict adherence to Miranda v.
Arizona,3" said,
[W]e . . . declare that Harris [v. New York] is not persuasive
authority in any state prosecution in California.
We pause ... to reaffirm the independent nature of the Cali-
fornia Constitution and our responsibility to separately define and
protect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions
of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Consti-
tution.n
Justice Brennan suggests that such developments illustrate one of the
great strengths of our federal system: "[lit provides a double source
of protection for the rights of our citizens."" To the extent that state
courts heed Brennan's call to "thrust themselves into a position of
prominence in the struggle to protect the people of our nation from
governmental intrusions on their freedoms,"3 5 the right of privacy
may find more protection in state constitutions than the Supreme
Court has allowed it under the Federal Constitution.
If a state constitution does not expressly refer to a right of pri-
vacy, state courts are left to discover guarantees of privacy in the
interstices of the constitutional text. 8 Although several state consti-
tutions explicitly guarantee a right of personal privacy," the mere
fourth amendment standard, see State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975);
cases from California and Hawaii that demand a standard of reasonableness, rather
than automatic validation, for searches incident to lawful arrest, compare People v.
Brisedine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975), and State v.
Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974), with United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); a Michigan case that entitles suspects to the assistance of counsel when a
photographic identification procedure is used, compare People v. Jackson, 391 Mich.
323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), with United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); and cases
that establish a right to trial by jury even for petty offenses, see State v. Sklar, 317
A.2d 160 (Me. 1974); Parham v. Municipal Court, 199 N.W.2d 501 (S.D. 1972).
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 114-15, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 368 (1976) (footnotes omitted). In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
the Supreme Court held that statements inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief
because not obtained in accordance with the procedural safeguards imposed by
Miranda were nevertheless admissible for impeachment.
34. Brennan, supra note 30, at 503.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976). The New
Jersey Supreme Court, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), and
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), found a right of privacy in the New Jersey
Constitution: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natu-
ral and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtain-
ing safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1.
37. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed
19781
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inclusion of a privacy article in a state constitution has not always
persuaded state courts to give explicit judicial sanction to signifi-
cantly enlarged or consistently applied guarantees of individual au-
tonomy." Furthermore, no state constitution makes the conceptual
distinction between autonomy and informational privacy. Likewise,
no state constitution appears to impose any positive duty upon state
government to exercise care or watchfulness in information collec-
tion, maintenance, and dissemination. 9
." ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 22.
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." Aiz. CONST. art. 11, § 8.
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not be violated
." HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5.
"The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or inter-
ceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means .... " ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
"Right to Privacy: Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communi-
cations, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or inva-
sions of privacy. . . " LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
"The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 10.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall
not be violated. . ... S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
38. For example, courts applying state constitutional privacy provisions have
nevertheless held that intrusive antiabortion statutes were not violative of privacy, see
State v. Campbell, 263 La. 1058, 270 So. 2d 506 (1973), and that "no constitutional
right of privacy. . . encompasses the right to use and possess marijuana [within one's
home]," State v. Anderson, 16 Wash. App. 553, 558 P.2d 307, 309 (1976).
39. "Illinois is ...the only state whose constitution explicitly guarantees an
affirmative legal remedy for privacy invasions [ILL. CONST. art I, § 12]. So far, how-
ever, the Illinois courts have not been asked to decide whether the State constitutional
right extends to records a private-sector record keeper maintains about an individual."
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, app. 1, at 1 (Privacy Law in the
States).
None of the nine state constitutional privacy articles, the texts of which appear
at note 37 supra, explicitly refers to the concept of informational privacy. Recently,
however, a California court of appeals held that the constitutional right of privacy
extended to the disclosure of personal information. See Porten v. University of San
Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
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This is not to say that a constitutional approach to data privacy
is fundamentally misconceived. A carefully drafted state constitu-
tional amendment would provide an authoritative and permanent
guide for those courts that are otherwise hesitant to protect reasona-
ble expectations of personal privacy. To be fully effective, however,
a privacy amendment should be adopted only after a detailed public
examination of the costs and benefits of a constitutional commitment
to personal privacy. 0 Given the political complexities of the amend-
ment process-especially in Minnesota 4'-it appears that the better
approach, for the immediate future, would be to provide more protec-
tion for data privacy by statute.
Ill. THE MINNESOTA DATA PRIVACY ACT
A majority of states have enacted statutes governing various as-
pects of informational privacy." Most take a topical approach, guar-
anteeing a measure of data privacy within such narrow contexts as
taxation, education, welfare, and state employment.43 A topical ap-
proach, however, can offer little general protection for informational
privacy concerns. Minnesota was the first of several states to recog-
nize this deficiency and take steps to correct it by enacting compre-
hensive legislation stressing minimal principles of "fair information
practices."4
Like other recently enacted comprehensive data privacy stat-
utes,4" the Minnesota Data Privacy Act,4" originally adopted by the
40. For example, a preliminary public dialogue on data privacy is being held in
Minnesota from April through June 1978, supported by a special grant from the Minne-
sota Humanities Commission. As part of this program, conferences on the data privacy
issue are scheduled for cities throughout the state.
41. See Mitau, Constitutional Reforms in Minnesota-Change by Amendments,
1947-1977, in PERSPECTr S ON MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT AND POLIrICS 55 (M. Gieske &
E. Brandt eds. 1977).
42. For a compilation of state informational privacy statutes, see PRIVACY PRO-
TECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, app. 1, at 29-85 (Privacy Law in the States).
43. Delaware's law is a good example of the topical approach to informational
privacy. The Delaware Freedom of Information Act, DEL. CODE tit. 29, §§ 10001-10005
(Supp. 1977), contains exemptions for personnel, medical, and educational files and
for records exempted by statute or common law, including driving records, public
assistance records, adoption records, school records, arrest records, and juvenile court
records. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, app. 1, at
38 (Privacy Law in the States).
44. MINN. STAT. § 15.162 (1976).
45. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-801 to -810 (Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4-190 to -197 (West Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66A, §§ 1-3, ch.
214, § 3B (West Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1977);
VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377 to -386 (Supp. 1977).
46. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.169 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
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Legislature in 1974,11 parallels the Federal Privacy Act of 1974.48 The
goal of such comprehensive data privacy legislation is threefold: (1)
to facilitate the correction of inaccurate records by ensuring data
subjects access to information about themselves; (2) to impose duties
on governmental agencies to exercise reasonable precautions against
misuse of personal data and to generally govern the disclosure of data
to third parties; and (3) to provide, with varying degrees of coverage,
some legal remedies to individuals to effectuate their informational
privacy rights.49
The Minnesota Privacy Act regulates the classification and dis-
semination of any records, files, or processes that identify an individ-
ual and that are retained or intended to be retained on a permanent
or temporary basis. 9 The Act stipulates that information may be
classified as public,"1 private," or confidential,53 but provides no
guidelines concerning how specific types of information should be
categorized.
Public data is defined to include all information that is accessi-
ble to the general public. 4 Every custodian of public records is re-
quired to keep public data in such an arrangement and condition as
to make them readily accessible for convenient use. 5 Except as other-
wise provided by law, he must permit all public data to be inspected,
abstracted, or copied at any reasonable time and, upon demand and
payment of fees, furnish certified copies thereof." Private data de-
notes information that is accessible to the subject of the information
but not to the public.57 Private data generally cannot be collected,
47. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 479, 1974 Minn. Laws 1199 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 15.162-.169 (1976 & Supp. 1977)). Since 1974, the Data Privacy Act has been
frequently amended. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 790, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1012
(West); Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 375, 1977 Minn. Laws 825; Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch.
283, 1976 Minn. Laws 1063; Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch. 239, § § 2-6, 1976 Minn. Laws 880;
Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 401, 1975 Minn. Laws 1353.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 52a (1976).
49. Virginia is the only state with a comprehensive informational privacy act
that does not provide at least some form of legal recourse for aggrieved data subjects.
Arkansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Utah permit both compensatory and puni-
tive damages and allow for recovery of attorneys' fees. The Ohio statute does not
permit the recovery of attorneys' fees, but makes information obtained in violation of
disclosure provisions inadmissible as evidence in a legal proceeding. See generally
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, app. 1, at 5 (Privacy Law in the
States).
50. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.167 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
51. MINN. STAT. § 15.162(5b) (1976).
52. Id. § 15.162(5a).
53. MINN. STAT. § 15.162(2a) (Supp. 1977).
54. MIN. STAT. § 15.162(5b) (1976).
55. Id. §§ 15.162(5b), .17(4).
56. Id. § 15.17(4).
57. Id. § 15.162(5a).
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stored, used, or disseminated for any purpose other than that stated
to the data subject at the time of collection. 8 Confidential data is
defined as any information that is accessible to neither the individual
subject nor the public.5
The officials responsible for the collection, use, and dissemina-
tion of any data on individuals are designated by law or by the Com-
missioner of Administration as responsible authorities." Every re-
sponsible authority is charged with limiting the collection, storage,
use, and dissemination of data to that necessary for the administra-
tion and management of programs specifically authorized by the Leg-
islature or local governing body or mandated by the federal govern-
ment and with establishing procedural safeguards to ensure that all
public, private, or confidential data on individuals are accurate.' A
responsible authority must periodically submit to the Legislature a
description of each category of record, file, or process relating to
private or confidential data on individuals maintained by his
agency."
The Data Privacy Act confers explicit legal rights on data sub-
jects. An individual asked to supply private or confidential data con-
cerning himself must be informed by the collecting state agency of
the purpose and intended use of the requested data, any right he
may have to refuse to supply the requested data, any known conse-
quence arising from his supplying or refusing to supply such informa-
tion, and the identity of other persons or entities authorized by state
or federal law to receive the data. 3
An individual also has the right to be informed whether he is the
subject of stored data and whether such data are classified as public,
private, or confidential. A subject of stored data must be shown pub-
lic and private data without expense and be informed of the content
58. Id.
59. MiNN. STAT. § 15.162(2a) (Supp. 1977). One significant change made by the
1976 Legislature was the creation of an "emergency data classification system" under
the authority of the Commissioner of Administration. See id. § 15.1642. An agency of
state or local government may apply to the Commissioner "on an emergency basis" to
have information classified as private or confidential. Id. § 15.1642(1). The party
seeking the classification must demonstrate that no statute exists that would allow or
forbid a classification of the information as private or confidential, that data for which
the application is being sought have been treated similarly in the past, and that a
compelling need exists for the classification. Id. § 15.1642(2). If the Commissioner of
Administration concurs in the classification, it is submitted to the Attorney General
for approval; if he does not, the data become public data. Id. § 15.1642(3). The Legisla-
ture is to make final determinations on such classification, apparently by statute. Id.
§ 15.1642(1).
60. Id. § 15.162(6).
61. MINN. STAT. § 15.1641 (1976).
62. Id. § 15.163.
63. MINN. STAT. § 15.165 (Supp. 1977).
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and meaning of those data. 4 A data subject may, upon notification
in writing to the appropriate responsible authority,"5 contest the accu-
racy or completeness of public or private data, and the determination
of the responsible authority may be appealed pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
6
A responsible authority who violates any provision of the Minne-
sota Data Privacy Act is liable to a person who suffered damage as a
result of the violation; 7 an injured person may also initiate an action
against the relevant political subdivision for damages sustained, plus
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.6
IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED DATA PRIVACY ACT-
SOME CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTIONS
The Minnesota Data Privacy Act, while commendable as an ini-
tial effort, simply does not go far enough to protect emerging expecta-
tions of informational privacy. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the
Minnesota Legislature in 1975 created the Joint Legislative Privacy
Study Commission to conduct a detailed public analysis of the data
privacy problem. 9 Although the Commission found it necessary to
narrow the scope of its study,7" and was thus unable to furnish the
comprehensive report requested by the Legislature,7 ' it did present a




66. MINN. STAT. § 15.1641 (1976).
67. Id. § 15.166.
68. Id.
69. The Privacy Study Commission was established for the purpose of studying
and investigating the collection, storage, use, and dissemination of data on individuals
by political subdivisions, state agencies, statewide systems, and any other public or
private entity in the state. See id. § 15.169. The Commission included Senators Eugene
Merriam, John Keefe, and Robert Tennessen, and Representatives John Lindstrom,
John Arlandson, Willian Dean, and B.J. Philbrook. The Commission had four major
responsibilities: (1) to determine whether executive orders, attorney general opinions,
regulations, laws, and judicial decisions in the area of data privacy are consistent with
individual privacy. and other constitutional guarantees; (2) to determine the effect of
federal law on collection, storage, use, or dissemination of personal data; (3) to analyze
the standards and criteria governing programs, policies, and practices relating to the
use of personal data; and (4) to collect all available information pertaining to the data
privacy issue. See id.
70. The Data Privacy Commission limited its efforts to making recommenda-
tions for improving privacy protection in the areas of public welfare and law enforce-
ment and the practice of purchasing lists of names from state agencies for mass mail-
ings. See generally JOINT HOUsE-SENATE PIUVACY STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO TIM




Unfortunately, legislative response to the findings of the Privacy
Commission has been minimal,7 2 perhaps because of analytical and
political difficulties surrounding informational privacy. To aid poli-
cymakers dealing with the complexities of this issue, the Article will
expand upon a number of the most significant observations of the
Privacy Commission and examine some deficiencies in the Data Pri-
vacy Act that were not discussed by the Commission. While this
critique cannot provide an exhaustive analysis of the data privacy
question, it is hoped that a discussion focused on the most critical
aspects of the problem will illuminate future legislative discussion.
A. MINIMIZING DATA INGESTION
Among the Commission's major findings were the observations
that too much information is collected by many governmental agen-
cies73 and that "much of the data collected is unnecessary or irrele-
vant to agency activities."'" The Commission found that these prob-
lems resulted, in part, from a lack of specific statutory guidelines for
data collection.75
The collection of information from the data subject is the begin-
ning of the data privacy relationship. Whenever personal information
is collected by a governmental agency, there is potentially a loss of
privacy to the data subject. Government, however, must remain
accountable to the governed, and the flow of information in the public
sector is necessary to measure the efficacy of public programs. Thus,
to the extent that the data subject provides information in order to
receive governmental services or other state-conferred benefits, he
may have to bear some risks arising from disclosure of personally
sensitive data. If the individual understands the risks and benefits,
or if he can command competent legal assistance, he may be able to
make an intelligent choice between providing the data and forgoing
the benefits.
72. The 1977 Legislature enacted various definitional and procedural changes to
bring the statute in line with the provisions of federal law. See Act of June 2, 1977,
ch. 375, 1977 Minn. Laws 825 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162, .1642, .165 (Supp.
1977)). The 1978 Session of the Legislature acted to extend to July 31, 1979, the
expiration date of the emergency classification system, see note 59 supra, and to
prohibit dissemination of government-held data to Interpol, an international private
investigative organization. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 790, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1012 (West).
73. See MINNESOTA PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 70, at 6.
74. Id.
75. See id. The Commission also found that too much information is collected
because of administrative willingness to cooperate with federal and state statistical
research. See id. at 9-10.




An individual's competency in privacy matters is, however, sel-
dom adequate. In an experiment conducted in a Georgia mental
health assistance program, data collection dropped from 100% to 20%
after subjects were informed that failure to provide information
would not result in any loss of services.7 Furthermore, there are some
instances in which the individual cannot control the collection of
data, such as where information is obtained from third parties.
As a general proposition, therefore, minimizing data ingestion is
a vital objective. It is, however, an objective that is difficult to
achieve. Although broad agreement could probably be reached with
respect to certain types of data collection that should be proscribed
altogether, such as where information is sought concerning an indi-
vidual's political activities or the organizations with which he asso-
ciates,7" complete categorization efforts would require consensus on a
number of subtle ethical, personal, and social issues. Rather than
attempting the endless series of detailed qualifications such an effort
would demand, attention should be focused on providing broad legis-
lative standards for minimizing the ingestion of data.
The Minnesota Legislature might begin by enacting a statutory
policy statement clearly setting forth a commitment to "minimum
intrusiveness," a goal of the Federal Privacy Act" and an objective
of the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission. 0 Assuming an
established need for information, minimum intrusiveness means that
a specified piece of information should only be gathered if it is not
extraneous to that need. As the Minnesota Privacy Study Commis-
sion observed, such a goal has not always been achieved by state
agencies.8 ' For instance, the Commission found that a job application
form used by the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare for a
position that required a valid driver's license asked whether the ap-
plicant's license had ever been suspended or revoked. 2 The Commis-
sion suggested that it is not necessary to know such information to
determine that an applicant is a qualified driver. Thus, the Commis-
sion recommended that all forms requesting data should be specifi-
cally and narrowly drawn so that they do not ask for unnecessary or
irrelevant information.M
77. See A. WESTIN, COMPUTERS, HEALTH RECORDS, AND CITIZEN RIGHTS 243-44
(NBS Monograph No. 157, 1976).
78. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
79. 5 U.S.C. §°552a (1976).
80. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 14-17. The object of
minimum intrusiveness is "to create a proper balance between what an individual is
expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and what he seeks in return." Id.
at 14.
81. See MINNESOTA PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 70, at 6.




While the existing Data Privacy Act purports to limit the collec-
tion of data to those "necessary for the administration and manage-
ment of programs specifically authorized,"84 the state's commitment
to minimizing data ingestion has been hampered by the lack of uni-
form standards of necessity.85 This problem could best be addressed
by a statute directing the Department of Administration to conduct
a continuing evaluation of the information collected by state agen-
cies, which in turn could form the basis of comprehensive regulations
governing data ingestion.
It must also be recognized that any collection of data from an
individual involves a certain cost to society in that personal privacy
is thereby diminished. This cost should be explicitly acknowledged
by the Legislature: any policy action that requires the collection of
new data from individuals should be accompanied by some measure-
ment of the extent to which the action imposes on privacy.
All of these objectives-ensuring minimal intrusiveness, evaluat-
ing necessity, and analyzing societal costs and benefits-could be
facilitated by requiring a "privacy impact statement" for all new
legislative and administrative programs. While not approaching the
technical complexity of an environmental impact statement,8 a pri-
vacy impact statement could provide an index of privacy costs before
a program was actually adopted by requiring the proponents of a
particular program to evaluate it in light of a number of considera-
tions:
(1) Quantitative Intrusiveness-a calculation of the
number of data required by the program and the cost of col-
lecting and maintaining those data;
(2) Qualitative Intrusiveness-an assessment of the
impact of the data collection requirements on those residual
areas of privacy recognized as critical by the courts 7 and the
public;
(3) Collection Technique-a description of the method
of data collection,88 with special emphasis on the distinction
between primary and secondary collection;"
84. MINN. STAT. § 15.1641(b) (1976).
85. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
86. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04 (1976).
87. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (personal health); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (family matters); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Inves-
tigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (membership and contribution records); Ravin
v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975) (personal activity within one's home).
88. If the collection procedure necessitates the subject's informed consent, see
text following note 76 supra, the statement should also specify the procedure for ob-
taining consent.
89. "Primary data collection" is the process of collecting data directly from the
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(4) Expected Use and Dissemination-an identifica-
tion of the intended use of data by administrative agencies; 0
(5) Anticipated Length of Retention-an estimate of
the time period during which the data will continue to be
accurate and useful for their stated purpose;9'
(6) Responsible Authority-a designation of the offi-
cials responsible for data collection, use, and dissemination. 2
Operationally, the privacy impact statement could be built upon
the experience of the Office of Management and Budget in imple-
menting the Federal Privacy Act of 1974.13 To comply with the re-
quirement that Congress be given notice of any proposal to establish
or alter a system of personal data,94 the Office of Management and
Budget established a set of threshold conditions for determining
when such a notice must be filed. 5 In a Minnesota adaptation, 'a
privacy impact statement could be required whenever (1) legislative
funding or authorization is sought for a new program that requires
collection of personal information; (2) a change is proposed in an
existing system of records that would increase the number of indi-
vidual data subjects, expand the types of data collected, or increase
the quantity of data collected; (3) a change in the storage system for
personal information is proposed; (4) an alteration in the purpose for
which data are to be collected or used is suggested; or (5) new regula-
tions are proposed to change procedures for data collection, storage,
use, or dissemination.
data subject; "secondary data collection" is the process of collecting data from third
parties.
90. Agency officials should identify (1) the intended procedures for data storage,
(2) the agencies or individuals that will be given access to the data, and (3) the
contemplated method of notifying data subjects of any changes in the use of personal
data pertaining to them.
91. When the data are no longer useful for their stated purpose, explicit justifi-
cation should be required for permanent storage, without which the data would have
to be removed from the system. See notes 110-13 infra and accompanying text.
92. A system-wide index, naming the responsible authorities for data and clas-
sifying the data by type or program subject should be maintained as a public docu-
ment, formally filed and kept current. Such a designation system would provide ag-
grieved individuals or their advocates a means of establishing agency and individual
responsibility for data misuse.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
94. Each agency shall provide adequate advance notice to Congress
and the Office of Management and Budget of any proposal to establish or
alter any system of records in order to permit an evaluation of the probable
or potential effect of such proposal on the privacy or other personal or prop-
erty rights of individuals or the disclosure of information relating to such
individuals, and its effect on the preservation of the constitutional principles
of federalism and separation of powers.
Id. § 552a(o).
95. See 40 Fed. Reg. 45,877 (1975).
[Vol. 62:649
DATA PRIVACY
If the impact statement accompanies new legislation, it should
be appended to the authorizing bill and become subject to the same
hearing process." If it is supplied in relation to changes in existing
information systems, it should be reviewed by either a standing com-
mittee of the Minnesota Legislature or the Legislative Audit Com-
mission.'" In addition to estimating privacy costs in policy develop-
ment, the impact statement could serve as part of a legislative au-
thorization mechanism for the collection of data, replacing the cur-
rently ineffective general authorizations granted as a part of agency
power."
While the privacy impact statement would offer a process to
strengthen legislative oversight of the collection of data in general, it
would not in itself serve as a statutory safeguard against excessively
intrusive data collection. Standards that will provide the courts with
meaningful guidance in balancing privacy claims against the state's
interests in public health, welfare, safety, and order must be written
directly into legislation. Thereafter, administrators could formulate
information collection policy with the knowledge that an overbroad
collection would constitute a violation of the statute.
For data collection concerning such sensitive areas as religion,
association, health, or family matters, the Legislature should require
the agency to demonstrate that the information is necessary to a
compelling state interest. For less sensitive areas, a less rigid stan-
dard of reasonable necessity would be sufficient so long as the need
for such information is justified in terms of the purpose for which the
agency was created. Mere incantations of public necessity, safety,
order, welfare, convenience, or administrative symmetry, however,
should not be persuasive. If the normative legislative policy stan-
dards are to be meaningful, they must shift the burden of demon-
strating the need for data collection to the governmental agency,
which must then articulate completely the policy basis on which it
seeks information.
B. SAFEGUARDING DATA STORAGE AN) USE
The Minnesota Privacy Commission found several problems
with the provisions of the Data Privacy Act dealing with data storage
96. See generally J. DAVIES, LEGISLATrE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 89, 162-
63 (1975).
97. See MINN. STAT. § 3.97 (1976).
98. The Minnesota Privacy Study Commission cited MINN. STAT. § 257.33
(1976) as an example of vague and open-ended legislation. See MINESOTA PRIVAcY
REPORT, supra note 70, at 21-22. Because section 257.33 so broadly defines the duties
of the Commissioner of Public Welfare, personal data regarding matters such as ille-
gitimate births are collected without restriction and without regard for the Welfare
Department's need for the information.
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and use.99 The Commission recommended that the statute's classifi-
cation system be revised to establish a procedure for determining how
long public records should be stored.' °0
Any attempt to regulate data management requires an under-
standing of its relationship to other aspects of informational pri-
vacy.'"' Once information has been collected, any use thereof or any
decision with respect to it may compromise personal privacy. Classi-
fication of data may have implications for personal rights of access,
while dissemination of data may affect the individual's ability to
control who sees the data. Likewise, storage of data over a long period
of time may affect privacy because of the insecurity of data storage
and the tendency of data to become inaccurate.
The nature of the data management problem demands a general
legislative policy statement to guide particular agency decisions. In
the absence of formally articulated constraints in the current Data
Privacy Act, executives and administrators are left with wide discre-
tion in the implementation of the law. The mechanism that suppos-
edly governs the use and disclosure of personal data-the data classi-
fication system-provides only that data are to be classified as pub-
lic, private, or confidential. 02 It neither defines these terms by types
of data nor provides general criteria for data classification.
The problem of overbroad agency discretion is exacerbated by
certain facts of administrative life. The need to reduce the unantici-
pated consequences of administrative decisions gives rise to organiza-
tional imperatives toward maximizing the data base for decisionmak-
ing.'03 If a program operates in human service fields, this extensive
99. See MINNESOTA PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 70, at 10-13 (discussing MINN.
STAT. § 15.17 (1976)).
100. See id.
101. An agency's data management responsibilities encompass all aspects of the
privacy relationship-collection, storage, use, and dissemination.
[Tihe fact that an organization may use its records about individuals in
accounting for its operations to other centers of power and authority in
society. . . has important implications for any policy of record-keeping
regulation. It prompts caution in considering prohibitions on the collection
of items of information from or about individuals, but at the same time
draws attention to the need for special safeguards when requiring an organi-
zation to record any information about an individual that it does not need
to facilitate its own relationship with him.
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 9.
102. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
103. See generally Shackle, Decision: The Human Predicament, ANNALS, March
1974, at 1. According to Shackle, the motivation is to reduce unanticipated second and
third order consequences that may arise if decisions are made on the basis of inade-
quate information by "perfecting" (increasing the size of) the data base. See id. Sociol-
ogist Daniel Bell goes one step further, treating information as a resource that can form




data collection often unavoidably intrudes into personally sensitive
areas. 4 Moreover, agencies designed to perform such functions as
building highways or enforcing the law frequently view data security
and informational privacy rights as unwarranted and burdensome
demands.' Conscious of public pressures for accountability and high
expectations of performance, they perhaps understandably view pri-
vacy concerns as secondary to their program tasks. Thus, the absence
of legislatively imposed constraints results in insufficient organiza-
tional attention to legitimate individual expectations of informa-
tional privacy.' -
A primary goal of the next legislative session should be an im-
proved data classification system. This revision should delineate the
types of data to be placed in each category. The confidential classi-
fication' 7 presents a particular problem, since that label currently
limits the individual's right to see and perhaps correct data about
himself. Some safeguards are clearly necessary to avoid inconsisten-
cies and abuses in the application of the classification. An individual
who is the subject of confidential data should, at a minimum, be
given notice of that fact.' 8 The data subject should also have an
opportunity for a hearing to challenge the classification.
A second goal of data management policy in Minnesota should
be to ensure that all stored data.are accurate and timely, ini addition
to being necessary for the administration of a state agency or pro-
gram. Even with the data ingestion controls suggested previously, a
considerable number of data about individuals will continue to be
gathered. As the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission
noted, however, accurate data do far less harm than data that are
false, deleterious, or otherwise potentially dangerous. 9
104. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 458-
59.
105. See generally Baker, Record Privacy as a Marginal Problem: The Limits of
Consciousness and Concern, in SURVEILLANCE, DATAVEILLANCE AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS,
supra note 2, at 100-02.
106. See generally id. Baker's analysis of recordkeeping proceeds on two levels.
First, recordkeeping is largely a marginal activity, a nuisance for an organization that
operates on a set of goals, such as welfare payment, education, or preservation of order,
rather than an orientation to single individuals. Second, recordkeeping processes are
largely invisible to the subjects of data; consequently, it is unlikely that individuals
will come forward and pressure the recordkeeper into a concern for civil rights and civil
liberties.
107. MINN. STAT. § 15.162(2a) (Supp. 1977).
108. In cases where the data subject's psychological or medical condition may
be adversely affected by knowledge of the confidential data, it may be appropriate to
appoint a guardian who can discuss classification problems on behalf of the data
subject.
109. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 17-
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
To avoid the danger to privacy inherent in the very existence of
data inaccuracies, a relatively simple principle should become the
rule of data management in Minnesota: where information is un-
needed, it should be thrown away. To effectuate this goal, zero-based
information management systems u ° could be integrated into existing
program audit and evaluation systems for state and local service
programs."' This process would entail a periodic examination of the
agency's stored information resources in light of present agency re-
sponsibilities and would require a demonstration that the system
does not retain unnecessary, false, or inaccurate data. Each agency
holding personal data that it wished to retain would be required to
conduct an annual audit of such data under the direction of the De-
partment of Administration. Such an audit should address several
questions:
(1) Do the data duplicate other information held by the
same agency?
(2) Are data about an individual stored at more than
one location within the same agency?
(3) Are the data current?
(4) Are the data accurate?
(5) Does the individual file contain hearsay, third party
recollections, or impressions?
(6) Has any attempt been made to verify the data?
110. Zero-based information management is analogous to zero-based budgeting,
which was developed by Texas Instruments, Inc., in 1969 and applied to the Georgia
state budget in 1973 by then-Governor Jimmy Carter. See generally Pyhrr, The Zero-
Base Approach to Government Budgeting, 37 PuB. AD. REv. 1 (1977)..
A precedent for zero-based information management has been provided by courts
and legislatures that have recognized the dangers in retaining certain criminal records
and have attempted to regulate the retention of such data. See, e.g., In re R.L.F., 256
N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1977), noted in Comment, Criminal Procedure: Expungement of
Arrest Records, 62 MINN. L. REv. 229 (1978); MiNN. STAT. § 152.18 (1976). Twenty
states have legislation that provides for at least some form of expungement of non-
conviction information; seven states expunge conviction information following a period
of good behavior. There are also a number of cases supporting, on constitutional
grounds, the return of unneeded and potentially damaging data. Eddy v. Moore, 5
Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971), was the first case to recognize explicitly the link
between the return or removal of potentially damaging information and the right of
privacy: "There is a direct correlation between the loss of individual privacy and the
retention of arrest records." Id. at 342, 487 P.2d at 216. See generally United States
v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967) (ordering information expunged from Justice
Department files); see also Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ordering
the removal of fingerprints from the FBI's centralized files on statutory grounds).
111. Generally, the State Auditor is responsible for existing audit and evaluation
systems. See MINN. STAT. §§ 6.01-.71 (1976). Specifically, a zero-based management
system could be added to section 6.65.
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The burden should be on the agency to respond to these concerns. If
this cannot be done and the individual's relationship to the agency
is such that an extensive information profile need not be retained, the
data should be removed from the information system.
Individual citizens should also be involved in the zero-based data
management system. Data subjects whose files contain sensitive per-
sonal information should be notified of the existence of their files
when the datakeeping agency conducts its audit. Such notice would
allow the data subject the opportunity to contribute his knowledge
of the file's accuracy to the audit process. The individual should not,
however, be forced to wait for the audit process to challenge the
accuracy of a file. The provisions of the present law should be ex-
panded to place an ongoing duty on the dataholding agency either to
make requested corrections and deletions or to audit the file immedi-
ately for accuracy and currency.
Zero-based data management and storage systems will further
data privacy concerns not only during the period of data retention,
but also at the time of collection,"2 by increasing accuracy and by
raising administrative sensitivity to data privacy issues. The intent
of the system is not to place impossible demands on public adminis-
trators but to alter institutional priorities, which currently place little
emphasis on the personal expectations of informational privacy."' In
addition, it is hoped that this system would remove at least a large
portion of the unnecessary and potentially dangerous information
currently in state storage systems without placing burdens on the
individual to initiate removal through legal or administrative pro-
cesses.
C. STRENGTHENING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND REMEDiES
No set of legislative policies or administrative regulations can
provide absolute assurance that individual expectations of informa-
tional privacy will always be fulfilled. Although the dangers to the
individual data subject may be reduced through proper collection
and dissemination controls, they cannot be fully eliminated. The
existing Minnesota Data Privacy Act attempts to remedy this prob-
lem by granting data subjects the right to review their files and sug-
gest corrections,"4 except where the files are classified confidential."'
112. The task of justifying stored data would presumably encourage administra-
tors to collect only those data that are necessary, reinforcing the suggested ingestion
controls.
113. See text accompanying notes 103-06 supra.
114. See MiNN. STAT. § 15.165(c) (1976).
115. See id. § 15.165(b).
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Data subjects also have the right to sue for damages resulting from
violations of the Act.1
6
The enforcement of these remedies, however, requires the indi-
vidual citizen to possess an extraordinarily high order of analytical
and legal competence. The data subject must identify data locations,
be aware of procedures for access, and understand his legal rights."'
In addition, the citizen, must deal with administrative agencies that
do not always give high priority to informational privacy concerns.,
Minnesota's Data Privacy Act does little to ease this burden of
competence on the data subject. For example, mere knowledge of the
existence of a confidential file may be an inadequate basis for bring-
ing a remedial action because in many cases only an examination of
the file itself can show whether a cause of action exists. Thus, closure
of confidential files may seriously curtail effective and realistic re-
dress. Moreover, to secure an administrative remedy under the Data
Privacy Act, the data subject must bring his dispute under the provi-
sions of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act,"8 which pro-
vides that in contested cases all interested parties shall receive a
hearing before a hearing examiner. 20 Under the Procedure Act, how-
ever, "filings, testimony, and exhibits" presented in a contested data
privacy case would constitute part of the hearing examiner's "official
record"' 2-a public record.' Thus, the administrative remedy for
some informational privacy violations appears to require the data
subject to open his confidential files to the public.
Considerations of privacy aside, the hearing process itself usually
requires legal counsel."' Appeals to the courts may impose additional
litigation costs before a final resolution is achieved. Thus, under pres-
ent Minnesota law, an individual must assume the burden of securing
his own privacy expectations, which presumes legal competence and
resources that most people do not have. Opportunities for nonjudicial
116. See id. § 15.166(1).
117. See Baker, supra note 105, at 102-03. Even where the data subject has
knowledge of recordkeeping practices, protection of personal privacy requires the indi-
vidual to expend time, money, and energy.
118. See generally id., at 100-02.
119. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0411-.0426 (1976).
120. See id. § 15.0418.
121. See id.
122. "All officers... of the state... shall make and keep all records necessary
to a full and accurate knowledge of their official activities. All suchpublic records shall
be . . .of such quality as to insure permanent records." Id. § 15.17(1) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, under the terms of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, the hear-
ing cannot be closed. See id. § 471.705(1).
123. Hearings employ technical evidentiary rules and cross-examination proce-




resolution of matters of this kind, though recommended by many
within the legal profession,'24 are limited under existing Minnesota
law. It seems appropriate that such opportunities be expanded by a
revised fair information practices policy.
Sweden's Data Act of 1973'5 suggests that the burden of reme-
dial action rests on the state, as the keeper of data.' 2 Although Swe-
den's law imposes specific obligations on the datakeeper for accuracy
and verification of data,'2 the concept need not be limited to these
tasks. As a general proposition, the State of Minnesota, as the keeper
of data on its citizens, should assume the burden of providing reason-
able remedial processes that would not involve burdens of extensive
litigation.
Remedies to enforce informational privacy must serve two func-
tions if they are to be considered successful. First, some mechanism
must be found to assist citizens in identifying and examining their
informational privacy problems. This "ombudsman" function serves
to provide data privacy expertise to citizens seeking assistance. Sec-
ond, a nonjudicial resolution of privacy disputes must be established
to reduce litigational costs for the average citizen and to prevent most
such disputes from reaching crowded court dockets. This
"mediation" function should also be a part of a comprehensive policy
regarding individual privacy rights and remedies.
California has chosen to combine both functions in an Office of
Information Practices.1 2 1 Specifically, the responsibilities of the
Office include assisting individuals in the identification of records
that may contain personal information, investigating violations of the
Information Practices Act, determining whether a violation has oc-
curred, reporting violations to the Governor and Attorney General,
124. Nonjudicial remedies for resolution and prevention of disputes between
individuals and governmental agencies have been suggested by the second American
Assembly on Law and a Changing Society. The Assembly has endorsed the use of
publicly funded ombudsmen and information mediation techniques. See Final Report
of the American Assembly on Law and a Changing Society II, 61 A.B.A.J. 931, 934
(1975).
125. Law of May 11, 1973, [1973] Svensk F6rfattningsamling [SFS] 289
(Swed.), reprinted in DATA PROTECTION LEGISLArON 129-40 (U. Damman, 0. Mall-
mann, & S. Simitis eds. 1977).
126. See generally id. §§ 8-24.
127. The duties imposed on the "responsible keeper of the register" are (1) to
make necessary verifications and correction in data held; (2) to ascertain the complete-
ness of the information; (3) to inform the data subject of information held on him;
(4) not to release information that may be used contrary to the Act; (5) not to make
data on individuals public without authorization. See id. §§ 8-14. The significant
contribution of the Swedish model is the obligation it places on the datakeeper to
protect informational privacy rights.
128. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.4-.8 (West Supp. 1978).
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and developing model guidelines for the implementation of the Infor-
mation Practices Act."2 9 The Office also provides mediation service
for individuals and agencies that do not choose to resort to court
action.'30
In Minnesota these functions could be served separately by cre-
ating a "Privacy Ombudsman" and expanding the authority of the
Legislative Audit Commission. Ombudsman models of citizen advo-
cacy,' 3' currently used in several states,3 2 could be adapted to data
privacy disputes with little difficulty. An ombudsman's duties could
include direct investigation of individual privacy complaints, investi-
gation of data security arrangements, and commencement of court
actions to enjoin unnecessary or deleterious collection of data by
other state agencies. 3 3 The Minnesota Legislative Audit Commission
129. See id. § 1798.4-.7.
130. See id. § 1798.8. Although mediation is available, aggrieved data subjects
are not required to resort to mediation before pursuing other remedies. See id.
131. "Ombudsman" is used to denote an office established by the legislature and
headed by an independent public official. The ombudsman, after receiving a com-
plaint against a governmental agency, official, or employee, would conduct an inves-
tigation and on the basis of his findings recommend corrective action in those cases
where the complaint was justified. See Frank, State Ombudsman Legislation in the
United States, 29 U. MiAMI L. REV. 397, 397-98 (1975).
132. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.55.010-.340 (1976); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 96-1
to -19 (1976); IowA CODE §§ 601G.1-.23 (1977). For a comparative analysis of state
ombudsman statutes, see Frank, supra note 131.
133. A framework for ombudsman legislation has been suggested by the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Ombudsman Committee. See ABA MODEL OMBUDSMAN STATUTE
FOR STATE GOVERNMENTS (1974), reprinted in Frank, supra.note 131, at 402-43. Minne-
sota may wish to adopt section 11 of the ABA Model Act:
The Ombudsman shall have the following powers:
(a) to investigate, on complaint or on his own motion, any act of an agency
without regard to its finality;
(b) to adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind rules and regulations re-
quired for the discharge of his duties-including procedures for receiving and
processing complaints, conducting investigations, and reporting his find-
ings-not inconsistent with this Act. However, he may not levy any fees for
the submission or investigation of complaints;
(c) to examine the records and documents of any agency;
(d) to enter and inspect without notice the premises of any agency;
(e) to subpoena any person to appear, to give sworn testimony or to produce
documentary or other evidence that is reasonably material to this inquiry;
(f) to undertake, participate in or cooperate with persons and agencies in
such conferences, inquiries, meetings, or studies as might lead to improve-
ments in the functioning of agencies;
(g) to obtain such information and make such inquiries from any agency
or person as he shall require for the discharge of his duties;
(h) to maintain secrecy in respect to all matters and the identities of the
complainants or witnesses coming before him;
(i) to bring suit in [district court] to enforce the provisions of this Act;
(j) to establish and administer a budget for his office;
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could be given mediation jurisdiction over disputes between data
subjects and state agencies arising from the operation of the Data
Privacy Act or any future informational privacy statute. 34 To avoid
privacy problems caused by the currently available review procedure
under the Administrative Procedure Act,1 provision should be made
for an in camera examination of stored data by the Audit Commis-
sion, the individual citizen, and the responsible authority in the dis-
pute.
Since there is little experience with the above described models,
it is not yet possible to draw conclusions as to their efficacy in en-
suring attention to individual privacy expectations. At this point,
however, the emphasis should not be on structural details but rather
on ensuring that the services necessary for securing individual rights
and remedies are reasonably well provided.
D. A SUGGESTED FAIR INFORMATION PRAcrIcES POLICY
As the Minnesota Legislature proceeds to refine its approaches
to information practices policy and to develop new laws governing the
problems of data ingestion, data management, and the rights of indi-
vidual data subjects, it seems appropriate to consider the normative
foundations upon which such a policy could be based. As a key to
reform, this "frame of reference" should reflect the major values upon
which legislation and administrative regulations could be based. In
legislation, it would take the form of a set of legislative findings or a
statement of purpose3 ' and become the basis upon which implemen-
(k) to concern himself with strengthening procedures and practices which
lessen the risk that objectionable administrative acts will occur.
Id. § 11, reprinted in Frank, supra note 131, at 420-21.
134. One approach would be to add the following language to MINN. STAT. § 3.971
(1976):
POWERS AND DuTiEs OF LEGIsLATIvE AUDITOR.
Subd. 3. To resolve disputes arising out of the collection, use, and dis-
semination of any data on individuals, as defined by Minnesota Statutes,
section 15.162(3), the office of the legislative auditor shall be charged with
the authority to review and decide appeals pursuant to requested relief from
any violation of sections 15.162 to 15.169, committed by the responsible
authority stipulated therein.
135. See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
136. The California Information Practices Act of 1977, for example, begins with
the declaration that "the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right pro-
tected by Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution of California and by the United
States Constitution and that all individuals have a right of privacy in information
pertaining to them." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.1 (West Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission presented three
objectives for legislation:
-to create a proper balance between what an individual is expected to.




tational strategies should rest.
First, a legislative policy statement should constitute a recogni-
tion that informational privacy is essential to the freedoms of individ-
ual citizens. In the absence of effective constitutional protection for
informational privacy, 137 this type of commitment would provide
administrative and judicial agencies a basis upon which to rest their
determinations.
Second, a legislative policy statement should insist that the
state, as the keeper of personal data, bear the burden of fairness in
the operation of governmental information systems. This burden
demands that all actions by an administrative agency with respect
to personal information be conducted in such a manner as to promote
the rights of individual citizens to informational privacy.
Third, the state's responsibility for fairness should be enhanced
by the imposition of a duty on state government to take effective
measures to secure the expectations of privacy held by individual
citizens. Thus, the state would be committed to providing reasonable
means of enabling each citizen to be secure in his expectations of
informational privacy.
Although personal expectations of informational privacy cer-
tainly represent an important set of values, they are not the only
norms that must govern the development of information systems.
Privacy must coexist with considerations of openness in government.
Any move toward a more comprehensive data privacy law in
Minnesota will face severe scrutiny 1"-and properly so-in view of
this state's commitment to openness in government. The legislative
manifestation of this ethos of open government, the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law, 39 is one of the strictest in the nation." ' The statute
-to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will minimize the extent
to which recorded information about an individual is itself a source of unfair-
ness in any decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize
fairness); and
-to create and define obligations with respect to the uses and disclosures
that will be made of recorded information about an individual (to create
legitimate enforceable expectations of confidentiality).
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 14-15.
137. See text accompanying notes 15-41 supra.
138. The Minnesota Joint Media Committee is one example of a private group
active in monitoring changes in privacy legislation. In addition, metropolitan area
news organizations have given extensive coverage to privacy considerations. See Daw-
son, Privacy Battle Lines are Drawn, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Nov. 14, 1976, § 3, at 1,
col. 3; Morrow, Laws Which Shield Government From Public Eye, Minneapolis Star,
Aug. 1, 1977, § A, at 10, col. 3; Wehrwein, Limitations on Privacy, Minneapolis Star,
Dec. 22, 1976, § A, at 11, col. 1.
139. MINN. STAT § 471.705 (1976).
140. For a compilation of the various state laws on open meetings, see Guy &
McDonald, Government in the Sunshine: The Status of Open Meetings and Open
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provides that all meetings of any state agency, school district, or
other public body be open, except as provided by law."' Penalties
under the statute are strong; personal civil liability is imposed for
violation of the statute, and a third violation can mean loss of of-
fice.4 2 Judicial interpretations of the law have generally fallen on the
side of openness.",
Public opinion and the press in Minnesota will continue to insist
that the actions and decisions of government be carried out in public
view and will invoke the spirit of the first amendment and the Open
Meeting Law to enforce their demands. Clearly, some conflict may
arise between the competing values of openness and informational
privacy."' This conflict is probably unavoidable; no macrocosmic
solutions have yet been proposed that can accommodate both inter-
ests. Yet a strong and carefully drawn fair information practices pol-
icy need not foreclose aspirations of public openness. Indeed, such a
policy may actually serve to strengthen legitimate insistence on
"public business in public." First, it will minimize the ingestion of
unnecessary data by state government-data that are potentially
dangerous to personal privacy and do not contribute to open govern-
ment.4 5 Second, insistence upon greater accuracy in stored data can
Records Laws in North Dakota, 53 N.D.L. REv. 51, 54 n.27 (1976). See also UNIvERsrrv
OF MIssouRI, SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REP. No. 354,
THE CASE OF OPEN MEETINGS LAWS (1976).
141. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705(1) (1976).
142. See id. § 471.705(2).
143. See Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 296 Minn. 267, 208 N.W.2d 294
(1973); Quast v. Knutson, 276 Minn. 340, 150 N.W.2d 199 (1967); Lindahl v. Indepen-
dent School Dist. No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 133 N.W.2d 23 (1965); In re Minneapolis
Area Dev. Corp., 269 Minn. 157, 131 N.W.2d 29 (1964). See also OP. MINN. A'T'Y GEN.
10-b (July 3, 1975); id. 63a-5 (Feb. 5, 1975); id. 471e (Oct. 28, 1974); id. 63a-5 (Oct.
28, 1974); id: 63a-5 (Dec. 4, 1972); id. 63a-5 (Jan. 11, 1972); id. 125-a-14 (Sept. 8, 1970);
id. 471-e (Nov. 2, 1965); id. 471e (Sept. 18, 1962); id. 471e (Aug. 20, 1962); id. 161-A-
16(b) (Nov. 20, 1957); id. 63-H-5 (June 13, 1957).
144. Financial reporting requirements challenged on privacy grounds have been
upheld on the ground that some public interests are so compelling that they may
override individual privacy interests. See Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57
Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974). Even in the politically sensitive area of campaign
financing, the public's right to know has been held to override expectations that the
secrecy of the ballot would extend to campaign contributions. See Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976). Thus, it would appear that the courts will continue to balance the
competing interests of public accountability and personal privacy on a case-by-case
basis.
145. Here a problem of overly simplistic expectations may arise. Michael Baker
puts it well:
[The] generalized allegiance to privacy, confidentiality and due process
protections dissolves into a complicated set of opinions as the focus of ques-
tioning becomes more specific and the balance between individual liberties
and the practical needs of organizations is introduced as an issue. Striking
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help to ensure that when data are disclosed their harm to personal
privacy interests is minimized. Third, by setting out limited areas
where privacy interests should prevail, a legislative fair information
practices policy can foreclose attempts to shield what are properly
public data behind a ruse of privacy.
Conflict and debate that will arise between these values should
be welcomed, not feared. Through the state's political and legal bal-
ancing mechanisms-public meetings, the media, the legislature,
and the courts-an accommodation of interests may be achieved by
experiment and experience.
V. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This Article has proposed a number of data privacy standards
and strategies for governmental information systems. Although the
degree to which these standards and strategies may apply to the data
privacy issue in the private sector is beyond the scope of this Article,
it is increasingly clear that there is a growing public concern, for
perceived personal privacy violations by banks, credit investigators,
employers, and the insurance industry, among others.'46 The interre-
lationship between governmental and nongovernmental institutions
is frequently so close and intimate4 ' that norms and practices in one
section may have direct implications for the other. After all, large
scale corporate organizations exhibit behavioral characteristics quite
similar in nature to those of government. A multifaceted and experi-
mental approach toward an effective and comprehensive fair infor-
mation standards law by the Minnesota Legislature might well con-
tribute not only to the enhancement of credibility in government, but
also to the development of policies and practices by nongovernmental
institutions for the protection of individual privacy interests.
The purpose of this Article has been to guide the Minnesota
Legislature in addressing data privacy issues. Although the existing
Data Privacy Act contains several elements that work to protect ex-
a balance between such interests is complicated, to be sure, but most indi-
viduals do not appear to have the kind of strong consciousness of their own
civil liberties interests which might serve as a resource for beginning to deal
with record privacy problems.
Baker, supra note 105, at 107 (emphasis in original).
146. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 3-6.
147. The Privacy Commission noted that although governmental agencies could
use compulsory legal. procedures to obtain information from companies issuing credit
cards, most of the information conveyed to agencies such as the Internal Revenue
Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in response to informal requests
by letter, telephone, or personal visit by an agent. See id. at 53-55. For example, the
Commission estimated that up to 99.5% of the information received by the FBI on
credit card holders came through such informal requests. See id. at 54.
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pectations of personal data privacy,'48 it must be expanded to include
an integrated legislative policy that would minimize the fragmenta-
tion of administrative responsibility for data privacy problems. In
general, the Legislature must develop a realistic appreciation of the
problems citizens face when they seek to protect their expectations
of privacy-expectations that are essential to the establishment of
social relationships and the maintenance of personal freedom.
148. See generally notes 63-68 supra and accompanying text.
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